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A B S T R A C T
At present, as energy security has become one of the highest priorities discussed globally, swift social, ecological
and economic changes in the energy market are taking place. In many countries, local cooperatives have been
established that intend, among other goals, to purchase power grids and increase renewable energy production.
This paper presents the outcomes of a research project devoted to one speciﬁc case – BürgerEnergie Berlin (BEB).
This cooperative, which is bidding for a twenty-year concession to the Berlin power grid (the biggest in
Germany), intends to modernise it after the purchase in order to change it into a smart grid and enable a number
of local renewable sources to connect to it. A key success factors model for this cooperative – based on ﬁeld
studies and the use of inductive reasoning – is the original contribution to existing research on energy co-
operatives. The presented qualitative analysis, taking into account the details of the process of bidding for the
concession, can be an inspiration to cooperative researchers and practitioners and a contribution to a future
discussion on alternative solutions to the issues of public utilities ownership and their management.
1. Introduction
Many years after Amory B. Lovins's article ‘Energy Strategy: the
Road not Taken?’ (Lovins, 1976) was published, the turn towards re-
newable sources of energy has become a political priority. Lovins
maintains that energy producing devices should be located close to
energy end-users to avoid distribution losses and high transmission
costs, to reduce the reliance on large power generating facilities and,
consequently, to reduce the exposure to interest, escalation and mis-
timed demand forecasts (pp. 79–80). A model such as this can be put
into practice by means of modern green technologies operated and
managed by cooperatives. This paper concentrates on one such co-
operative – BürgerEnergie Berlin (BEB) – which is competing for the
concession to run the biggest grid in Germany. This purpose makes the
case really unique. One of the overarching goals of this cooperative is to
purchase the grid in order to invest in its future modernization, en-
abling the inclusion of renewable energies into the grid (hence its de-
centralization and change into a smart grid1), which corresponds with
Lovins’s vision.
The analysis presented in this paper is related to three theoretical
areas: electricity grid, energy2 cooperatives and institutions (factors
that aﬀect the attainment of the BEB goal). So far, no studies have been
carried out that would combine these issues. In order to bridge this
research gap, I conducted qualitative research – a method I chose after
having considered the nature of the problem under investigation (a
concrete case study). The paper is based on twelve semi-structured
interviews conducted during the research course in 2014, which are
quoted throughout the paper, as well as participant observations and
examination of press releases and academic literature. I adopted this
approach in an eﬀort to preserve the inductive method of reasoning
(drawing from details to formulate general ﬁndings), capturing the
character of individual interpretations and complexity of the situation
(see the Methods section), which served to build the model (see Fig. 1)
that answers the research question: what are the internal and external
factors, as well as patterns and relationships among them, considered
by BEB’s environment as essential for the purchase of Berlin’s power
grid?
The latest power grid literature focuses primarily on topics such as
utilities regulation (e.g. Spiller & Tommasi, 2008, pp. 515–543), at-
tempts to purchase grids by municipalities (Schorsch & Faber, 2010;
Theobald & Pál, 2013), or problems related to the management of
utilities by large corporations that are reluctant to invest in expensive
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grids adaptations to be able to integrate small local generators (e.g.
Sovacool, 2008). Not much attention is devoted to applying for con-
cessions by electricity cooperatives, although the example of a small
cooperative from Schönau managing the local power grid is frequently
referred to (Cappelletti, Vallar, & Wyssling, 2016; Yildiz et al., 2019, p.
284). Electricity cooperatives are described in detail in the literature on
the subject (e.g. Yildiz et al., 2015; Müller et al., 2015; Holstenkamp &
Kahla, 2016; Holstenkamp et al., 2017; Rommel, Radtke, von Jorck,
Mey, & Yildiz, 2018) but it should be emphasised that they are quite
dissimilar – the ones generating energy have little in common with
large retail cooperatives like Greenpeace Energy, and small heat grids
governed by local cooperatives (the most popular in Germany) bear
little resemblance to Berlin’s grid (see the description of electricity
cooperatives in Germany in the next section). Taking that fact into
consideration, the analysed example has a chance to become an in-
spiration for scientists as well as practitioners studying and promoting
the takeover of utilities by cooperatives. To identify the factors that
aﬀect the achievement of the BEB goal, that is the purchase of the grid,
in this article I use the new institutional economics (NIE) models, in
particular theories of Mancur Olson (1971), Sue E. S. Crawford and
Elinor Ostrom (1995), Elinor Ostrom (2005; 2009), Arild Vatn (2005)
and Konrad Hagedorn (2008). Before this BEB initiative is described
and examined in sections ﬁve and six of this paper, I explain the si-
tuation of the energy market in Germany and electricity cooperatives in
Section 2, and outline the history of the Berlin grid as well as the on-
going bidding process in Section 3. Research methods are presented in
Section 4. The analysis of BEB is followed by a discussion and conclu-
sions.
2. German energy market and electricity cooperatives
Since 1998, the energy industry in Germany has been subject to a
restructuring process, including the liberalisation and privatisation of
monopolistic energy suppliers which were divided into smaller units
responsible, according to the value chain, for electricity production,
transmission and sale (Brandt, 2006, p. 2). New public policies were
introduced, designed to separate energy producers from network op-
erators – a tactic aimed at creating a competitive market with grids
available to smaller energy providers (Lambing, 2012). Despite these
eﬀorts, the concessions to operate almost one thousand individual grids
have been granted to four major companies: TenneT, Amprion (RWE),
EnBW Transportnetz and 50Hertz (Vattenfall), all of which also own
electricity utilities (the largest four being E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vat-
tenfall) (OECD, 2012, p. 101). This privatisation process can be,
therefore, considered a state failure because it did not achieve the in-
tended result of creating a competitive market.
At the same time, the term Energiewende gained in popularity. It
was coined in the 1980s, denoting ‘growth and prosperity without
petroleum and uranium’ (Strunz, 2014, p. 150). This notion, however,
remained on the periphery of political discourse for thirty years –
consecutive governments largely disregarded it, much to the advantage
of big energy companies and favouring low electricity generation costs.
This logic is consistent with the assumptions of natural monopoly, de-
ﬁned by Kenneth E. Train as a situation when ‘a condition required for
competition (that is, numerous ﬁrms) conﬂicts with the attainment of
the beneﬁts of competition (namely, production at lowest possible cost,
which requires one ﬁrm)’ (Train, 1991, p.1). The properties of a natural
monopoly, the power grid in this case, such as speciﬁc large sunk in-
vestments, economy of scale and scope, and massive consumption of
energy (Spiller and Tommasi, 2008, p. 518) lead to market failure
(ineﬃcient distribution of energy by free market) and require regula-
tion to ensure socially desirable outcomes. Unless compelled by reg-
ulation, these large power generation and distribution corporations
have no interest in making expensive investments in renewable tech-
nologies or in reducing electricity consumption. Instead of costly wind,
solar or biomass energy, they tend to purchase and distribute energy
obtained from coal and gas (50 per cent of the total German energy
supply in 2017) and nuclear power plants (12 per cent of supply (AG
Energiebilanzen, 2017)). This fact can also be perceived as a policy
failure.
Fortunately, the supply chain management, including energy facil-
ities and infrastructure governance, has recently drawn much attention
of societies, governments and the private sector. I perceive this as a
response to three main issues related to the energy market:
• the problem of public goods that have been privatised, which often
leads to policy failures (primary focus on market monopolisation
and on gaining short-term proﬁts instead of investing in utilities to
improve system performance),
• environmental problems, including climate change (carbon dioxide
emissions), as well as safety concerns relating to the operation of
nuclear and coal power plants and their waste management,
• the control problem in increasing civil engagement in monitoring
and governance of public services, including the aspirations to es-
tablish participatory governance of the infrastructure.
Electricity cooperative(s), having ‘dual nature’, ‘forming both a so-
cial group and a business enterprise’ (Bonus, 1986, pp. 310–311) due to
their Genossenschaftsgeist (cooperative spirit), by oﬀering not only
rational arguments but also appealing to feelings (Draheim, 1952, pp.
43–44), can actively address these issues. As explained by Holger
Bonus, citing Georg Draheim’s monograph (Draheim, 1952): ‘the co-
operative spirit was to be considered a strength capable of aﬀecting
important business factors such as the kind, size, development, stabi-
lity, and competitiveness of the cooperative enterprise’ (Bonus, 1986, p.
311). In this approach ‘noneconomic motives’ play a vital role that is
related to the purpose of electricity cooperatives’ activities. On the one
hand, they express deep concern for the environment and community;
on the other, they represent civil society, often emerging from grass-
roots ecological movements.
A large number of new electricity cooperatives have emerged in
Germany recently – 832 have been established in the last ﬁfteen years,
Fig. 1. Key success factors for the BürgerEnergie Berlin purchase of the Berlin grid.
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coming up to a total of 907 in 2014 (Yildiz et al., 2015, p. 62). While
political and economic incentives were a powerful factor in this de-
velopment, other aspects were equally eﬀective. Among those were low
barriers to entry (the cost of a share is usually between EUR 50 and
5000, so a large portion of the population can partake if interested in
membership), playing an active role in decision-making processes due
to the democratic mode of cooperative governance, as well as the in-
stitutional support of Deutscher Genossenschafts-und Raiﬀeisenverband
(German Cooperative and Raiﬀeisen Confederation, DGRV) (DGRV,
2015) – involved in cooperative auditing and consulting that lowers
investment risk. Some of these electricity cooperatives achieved such
success that a number of new co-ops emerged in the region, which re-
sulted in cooperative clustering and encouraged the establishment of
umbrella organisations.
Today, energy cooperatives cover the entire energy value chain and
are usually classiﬁed as: power generation or production cooperatives
(the highest number in Germany n=635) that own and/or manage
and/or hold shares in companies that own the facilities for electricity
and heat production; transmission or distribution cooperatives
(n=198) that operate small local grids; and energy trading or selling
cooperatives (n=40) whose core operations consist of buying and
selling energy or energy resources (Yildiz et al., 2015, p. 62). The re-
search case analysed in this article, BürgerEnergie Berlin, focuses on
obtaining the concession to purchase and manage the biggest grid in
Germany, which is an unprecedented case on that scale.
3. Berlin grid and Bürgerenergie Berlin
As early as 1884, a pioneer public energy company Städtische
Elektricitäts-Werke was established in Berlin. It was the ﬁrst public
power plant and network operator in Germany. It was taken over by the
newly established private company Berliner Städtische
Elektrizitätswerke Akt.-Ges (BEWAG) in the 1920s, which leased the
facilities from the city of Berlin – the city retained ownership of the
utilities. The company grew and changed with the city, was divided
during the Berlin partition and merged back in 1990. Despite ownership
changes, the Berlin State remained a majority shareholder (50.8 per
cent) in BEWAG until 1997. The company was sold to Veba and Viag
(other shareholders) that later merged to form E.ON and sold its shares
to the Hamburgische Electricitäts-Werke AG (HEW), a subsidiary of the
Swedish power company Vattenfall in 2001 (Antikepapiere, 2015).
I think it was 12 years ago when Vattenfall bought the majority of
shares of BEWAG. […] Berlin had a massive problem with money,
many debts. Thus, the government tried to sell the state owned – so
Berlin owned – companies like GASAG – the gas company, the water
company and the energy company. […] Politicians said that it was a
good move not to sell the company to an investment group or any
other anonymous company, but a Swedish state-owned company.
[…] However, after the accidents in Krümmel – the German nuclear
plant – the trust in Vattenfall shrank rapidly. (Vattenfall re-
presentative, Interview)
The gas and energy distribution networks in Germany are subject to
concession contracts, therefore Vattenfall or any other grid owner
cannot use public roads or infrastructure to operate it without holding
the concession (Theobald & Pál, 2013). Since most of the power grid
concessions in Germany have just expired or will expire soon (Ecoprog,
2015) their re-granting process aroused much debate in the recent years
about their governance structure. The Berlin grid, one of the biggest in
Europe, with 35,000 km of underground cable and more than 8,000
substations, supplies more than 2.1 million households and 100,000
companies (Vattenfall representative, Interview). The concession to
operate it has expired in 2014, and the process of its re-granting,
troubled by many diﬃculties and setbacks, is still in progress.3 Until the
case is settled, Vattenfall remains the owner and the operator of the
grid.
One of the entities applying for the concession to the grid is the
organisation described in my research case, BürgerEnergie Berlin. It
was established in December 2011 and registered as a cooperative so-
ciety with legal rights to conduct commercial operations. Its intended
goal was purchasing property rights to the Berlin power grid in order to
provide electricity at reasonable prices to the citizens of Berlin, as well
as investing future proﬁts in the integration of renewable energies into
the grid, therefore making it decentralised and changing it into a smart
grid. Arwen Colell (a member of the BEB board of directors) recalls BEB
beginnings:
[w]e have been friends with Luise [Neumann-Cosel, second member
of the BEB board of directors at the time of the interview] for years
and we were both involved in renewable energies. […] We started to
discuss the Rekommunalisierung [re-municipalisation] idea and it
just came up. We thought – it is something we should do – buy the
grid. […] we established the cooperative and found people for the
supervisory board and 15 founding members. Then it grew. (Collel,
Interview)
At present, as the concession of the current operator Vattenfall ex-
pired, some options became available. BEB allows for two models of
ownership, with only one partner allowed to run the grid in cooperation
with Berlin Energie (BE) – a recently established state-owned company.
The one model described on the BEB website speciﬁes that 51 per cent
of shares is to be held by BE and 49 per cent by BEB (BEB, 2017;
Berliner Energietisch, 2015). The other model assumes a 75/25 per cent
division of shares between the partners (Hinnecke, Interview 1; Walter,
Interview).
When the concession granting process began at the end of 2011,
eight organisations were interested in buying the grid, including the
large corporations (Focus, 2012). Only three of the participating orga-
nisations remained involved until the current stage: Berlin Energie
alone, which is bidding for the whole network (which would mean re-
municipalisation of the grid), a Vattenfall subsidiary Stromnetz Berlin,
also bidding for 100 per cent of the grid (if it succeeds the situation will
remain unchanged) and the joint venture of BE and BEB described
above. Regardless of the bids by the interested parties, the Minister of
Finance and the Mayor of Berlin have the last word, in accordance with
the recommendations of Bundesnetzagentur (the Federal Network
Agency) and the Bundeskartellamt (the Federal Cartel Agency). The
conditions and the process of this infrastructure and management rights
transfer could be an interesting study to be replicated or followed by
other electricity cooperatives. However, this article focuses on the
success factors of BEB as a network organisation (Spiller & Tommasi,
2008) rather than property rights transfer per se (Bromley, 1991;
Demsetz, 1967).
4. Methods
This article is based on rich empirical data related to the
BürgerEnergie Berlin case study, used as the basis for inductive theory
development (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Mintzberg & Waters, 1982;
Siggelkow, 2007; Weick, 2007). It is claimed that ‘papers that built
theory from cases are often regarded as the ‘most interesting’ research
(Bartunek, Rynes, & Ireland, 2006) and are among the most highly cited
pieces’ (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The inductive approach was
chosen for this study to create theoretical constructs, emerging from
data collected during research, whose main goal was to ﬁnd an answer
to the research question:
3 The research on which this article is based was conducted in the second half
of 2014. The author has been waiting for more than three years for the con-
cession grant in order to publish this article. Thus far nothing suggests that the
concession will be granted in the upcoming year or two.
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- what are the internal and external factors, as well as patterns and
relationships among them, considered by BEB’s environment as es-
sential for the purchase of Berlin’s power grid?
Replication logic is central to the inductive research strategy
(Eisenhardt, 1989), thus the analysis of BEB as the subject of the case
study and the categorisation of success factors presented in the fol-
lowing sections of this article can be used by other researchers in their
empirical inquiries.
To evaluate the performance of BürgerEnergie Berlin, and to analyse
the previously mentioned factors of the grid rights transfer, three main
sources have been used.
First, an extensive literature review to capture the ideas and theo-
risations of electricity cooperatives (among others Röpke, 1992;
Mönkner, 2001; Bijman, Hendrikse, & Oijen, 2012; Bijman, Iliopoulos,
et al., 2012; Lambing, 2012; Mori, 2013; Yildiz, 2014; Yildiz et al.,
2015; Müller et al., 2015; Holstenkamp & Kahla, 2016; Holstenkamp
et al., 2017; Rommel et al., 2018) and power grids (among others Train,
1991; Hansmann, 1996; Spiller & Tommasi, 2008; Fox-Penner, 2010;
Schorsch & Faber, 2010; Theobald & Pál, 2013; Strunz, 2014), including
their history and current signiﬁcance. These theories resurface in all
sections of this paper, which helps to conceptualise the empirical ob-
servations made in Berlin.
Second, twelve semi-structured interviews with:
• both representatives of the BEB board of directors, two re-
presentatives of the BEB supervisory board (one of them also re-
presented GLS (Gemeinschaftsbank für Leihen und Schenken)
Treuhand in the interview), ﬁve members of the BEB Team (two
interviews were conducted with the same person – Matthias
Hinnecke – one in September, the other in November 2014),
• and, in order not to be biased in BEB’s favour, two representatives
from BEB’s external environment: one of them a direct competitor,
Vattenfall, and the other – Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung
und Umwelt (Senate Department for Urban Development and the
Environment). Both persons wanted to remain anonymous, which
can be perceived as a limitation to this study.
Apart from the nine interviews that were conducted in English,
three were conducted in German, therefore some of the quotes in this
article are translated. All interviews were conducted between August
and December 2014.
Finally, this paper draws on direct observations (Reinharz, 1992,
pp. 46–75; Creswell, 2009, pp. 173–202; Babbie, 2011, pp. 313–353) of
BEB events such as: a ﬁlm screening of ‘Das Schönauer Gefühl’ (The
Schönauer feeling) followed by a discussion, NetzGipfel (network
summit) and NetzLabor (network laboratory), information stands (in
September 2014 at the Brandenburger Tor and in November the same
year at Heldenmarkt) and one oﬃcial meeting (general assembly).
After a thorough examination of the collected press releases, aca-
demic articles, observations and interviews, a list of factors was pre-
pared (the inductive approach discussed above) and organised ac-
cording to the systematisation proposed in the literature (Aguilar, 1967;
Freeman & Louçã, 2001; Inglehart, 1997). The collected information
was veriﬁed by the simultaneous use of diﬀerent sources (triangulation)
to assure the credibility of the conducted inquiry study (Denzin, 2006;
Flick, 2011). For this purpose ATLAS.ti (the Qualitative Data Analysis &
Research Software) was used. The outcomes, described in the following
paragraphs, are also corroborated by literature (e.g. Hirschman, 1970;
Olson, 1971; Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; Vatn, 2005; Spiller & Tommasi,
2008) and, most importantly, can serve as an inspiration to other
electricity cooperatives.
The choice of the above methods, especially qualitative research
ones, was dictated by an attempt to answer the research question on the
speciﬁc case study of applying for a concession for running Berlin’s
power grid by BEB cooperative. Exploration of the above process
assumed the use of diverse research practices including gathering par-
ticipants’ opinions, allowing for values, examining the context and si-
tuation of participants, cooperating with them and interpreting the
collected data (Creswell, 2009, p.17). These practices were used to
build a coherent theoretical construct and collect factors that inﬂuence
the process of applying for a power grid concession, which are pre-
sented in Fig. 1 and discussed in the section below. I believe that this is
what makes this original paper useful for both cooperative researchers
and practitioners.
5. Research environment
The issue of the grid and its ownership garnered a lot of attention in
Berlin in 2011, when the Berlin alliance – the Berliner Energietisch
(BET) – started a re-municipalisation campaign (Berliner Energietisch,
2015). A referendum on energy policies of the city and the establish-
ment of a Berlin-owned municipal utility network was held on No-
vember 3rd, 2013. Although it failed, falling 21,000 votes short, it still
had a turnout of 600,000 citizens, with 83 per cent supporting re-mu-
nicipalisation, indicating that ‘they want change in the energy struc-
ture’ (Hinnecke, Interview 1). BürgerEnergie Berlin had supported the
BET campaign, collected signatures and organised complementary
events. However, a new strategy was adopted after the referendum.
Arwen Colell declared: ‘we are not campaigning for a pure communal
management. We don’t want to be recognised as a company against
Vattenfall. We want to be an alternative for Berlin’ (Colell, Interview).
Since then, BürgerEnergie Berlin has focused on its own activities and
events. It follows a traditional model, therefore only members of the
organisation can become members of the board of directors and the
supervisory board (Bijman, Hendrikse, et al., 2012; Bijman, Iliopoulos,
et al., 2012)4 . At the time the ﬁeldwork was performed, two women –
Luise Neumann-Cosel and Arwen Colell – held executive power over the
organisation, who have now been replaced by a woman and a man
(BEB, 2019). The length of term for members of the board of directors is
two years and they are nominated by the supervisory board, not elected
directly by members at the general assembly. Currently, six members
hold seats on the supervisory board, two women (both Arwen Colell
and Luise Neumann-Cosel) and four men (BEB, 2019), since according
to the Statute the number of the board members must be divisible by
three (Satzung der BürgerEnergie Berlin eG, §8 (2)). The term of oﬃce
for members of the supervisory board is three years, and one third of
their number is elected by the general assembly each year. Both the
board of directors and the supervisory board members can be re-
elected.
At the end of 2014, when the research was conducted, BEB had
around 800 regular members and more than 1800 people who have
transferred money to the GLS Treuhand escrow accounts, i.e. the so
called Treugeber. If the cooperative is granted the concession, the
Treugeber will automatically become members of BEB and their money
will turn into cooperative shares. Otherwise, the money will be re-
turned. Although the total number of members and Treugeber exceeds
2,500, only 100–120 attend general assemblies, as conﬁrmed by Peter
Schmidt and Luise Neumann-Cosel in the interviews and the observa-
tion of the general assembly on December 8th, 2014. Peter Schmidt
describes an average member as follows:
[She/He] is a green-minded person. We have representatives of all
generations, so we are not only supported by people sixty-plus. […]
The second feature of a member is a belief in democracy. […] We
also feel that it interests people from other countries; maybe they
can set up something similar in their own country. (Schmidt,
Interview)
4 Diﬀerent organisational models of energy cooperatives are also discussed in
more detail by Mathias Georg Dilger, Konter, and Voigt, (2017).
Z. Łapniewska Journal of Co-operative Organization and Management 7 (2019) 100094
4
Peter Schmidt is one of BEB’s campaigners who organise an in-
formation stand or a presentation once a month. Additionally, every
three months the group prepares campaigner seminars for members and
non-members who wish to become more involved in BEB activities. This
group numbers 30–40 people (according to Martina Jantsch,
Interview), but the core staﬀ of any speciﬁc event is 4–5 people, joined
by another 2–3 (Schmidt, Interview). All active members are referred to
as the ‘Team’ at BEB’s website, where twelve people are introduced
(BEB, 2019). Another campaigner, Kirsten Heininger, remarks that the
division of work takes place as early as at the seminars: ‘all people
introduce themselves, what they do, what is their background and then
BEB work is presented. Next it is all about who can do what. Who can
attend the information stand, who can sit in the oﬃce, who can make
calls, etc.’ (Heininger, Interview). She portrays members of the team
along these lines:
I would say ca. 70 per cent of the team are men, between late-20 s to
mid-40 s. They are typical political activists, especially men. They
like to talk a lot and to be everywhere. I think there are too few
women, that's why I would like to be even more involved. It is like
this in the energy sector. (Heininger, Interview)
It can be concluded from the interviews that gender is an important
factor at the BEB. Both founders are women, which is unusual in the
energy sector and, as both women and men are campaigners at BEB
information stands, the mix of both genders among members projects a
positive image of the cooperative.
All of the above statements are consistent with Hans H. Münkner’s
theory, according to which in order for a cooperative to grow, the
following minimum requirements have to be met: face-to-face com-
munication, heterogeneity of members, freedom to enter and exit, long-
term goals, collective memory and democratic rule (Münkner, 2001, pp.
16–22). The idea of multi-stakeholder cooperatives promoted by
Münkner is discussed by Henry Hansmann (1996) who deﬁnes homo-
geneous interest as a necessary precondition for a successful co-
operative organisation. BEB is a multi-stakeholder cooperative as some
of its members are companies and environmental organisations, and as
such they need to appoint individual people as representatives with
member powers. This solution avoids the conﬂict of interest that
Hansmann cites as the (probable) main reason for the non-existence of
urban utility cooperatives in the United States in the 1990s (Hansmann,
1996, pp. 173–181). In analysing the energy market, Hansmann
maintains that ‘under any type of voting scheme there might well be
substantial struggle among residential, commercial, and industrial
customers for control of the utility’ (Hansmann, 1996, p. 175). Such
developments may in fact take place in the future when BEB will have
inﬂuence over grid management. Until now, however, according to my
observations, conﬂicts of particular interests have been avoided. Today,
there is only one criterion for BEB membership: ‘we are not going to
work with any company that either owns or operates a nuclear power
plant or has shares of such a company’ (Neumann-Cosel, Interview).
The interest of private companies in the purchase of shares in the co-
operative – since not only residents can be BEB shareholders – counters
another argument quoted by Hansmann related to high capital intensity
of utilities (Hansmann, 1996, p. 170). At the same time, it is worth
mentioning that although Berlin is perceived as a poor city (which, of
course, depends on the frame of reference), 1.8 million inhabitants are
economically active (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2015). If
every one of these residents bought one share for EUR 500, BEB could
purchase the grid even without taking out a bank loan (see discussion
on grid price in the section below). Finally, although the city is very
heterogeneous, with many tenants and few owners, tenants can choose
their electricity supplier (Deutsches Mietrecht, 2018), which disproves
Hansmann’s last reservation regarding grid management by a co-
operative in the city, i.e. that tenants care little about the city’s infra-
structure (Hansmann, 1996, pp. 174–175).
6. The Bürgerenergie Berlin key success factors
Economists Chris Freeman and Francisco Louçã, known for their
research in innovation studies, introduce a ‘new research agenda’, fo-
cused on the one hand on natural processes in economies and societies,
but also on ‘conscious choice and purposeful action’ on the other
(Freeman & Louçã, 2001, p. 120). They encourage researchers to ob-
serve and describe an ‘action arena’ (after Elinor Ostrom, 2005, p. 13),
but also acknowledge the agency of ‘participants’. Furthermore, the
authors list sets of variables distinctive for social coordination: ‘the
technological, scientiﬁc, economic, political, institutional and cultural
subsystems’ as well as ‘the semi-autonomous variables connecting those
subsystems’ (Freeman & Louçã, 2001, p. 120). On the basis of their
research agenda premises, but also in conjunction with other re-
searchers’ works (e.g. Francis J. Aguilar, 1967; Ronald Inglehart, 1997),
I identiﬁed BEB success factors and grouped them into four categories:
Political, Social, Economic (all three can be characterised as sets ex-
ternal to BEB) and Internal, related to the heart of BEB as an organi-
sation (see Fig.1).
Conditions and mechanisms central to creating, developing and
maintaining an eﬀective and eﬃcient electricity cooperative depend on
reciprocal relations between the cooperative and its environment, il-
lustrated as two-way arrows in Fig.1, as well as on its focus on internal
qualities. On the one hand, the cooperative functions in the public space
and builds its political capital on its visibility, thus it requires a co-
herent internal environment and a consistent strategy. In turn, BEB’s
external environment has pervasive inﬂuence on its stability and
growth. Arwen Colell summarises these relationships as follows: ‘we
need to have political weight – and our chance, because we are very
small, is to be very loud and to be visible a lot’ (Interview). Her com-
ment points to all the sets presented in Fig. 1, showing that they are
interconnected and they aﬀect each other.
The most important political factor that inﬂuenced the bidding
process was the resignation of Berlin’s mayor Klaus Wowereit together
with his ﬁnance senator Ulrich Nussbaum5, followed by the appoint-
ment of Michael Müller6 for the new mayor and Matthias Kollatz-Ahnen
for the new ﬁnance senator by Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
(Social Democratic Party of Germany, SPD) members (DW, 2014). Be-
cause of this change, the issues that had taken place within the bidding
process and problems related to the gas grid concession, some steps of
the power grid concession process were repeated. The gas grid con-
cession granting process started a year before the energy concession
process and has followed a very similar trajectory. The gas grid was
previously governed by a large private conglomerate Berliner Gaswerke
AG (GASAG), but its concession expired in 2013. In March 2014 two
bidders remained: GASAG and Berlin Energie – the same newly estab-
lished public company that is bidding for the power grid. When Berlin
Energie won the concession, GASAG lodged a complaint with the court,
claiming that their competitor was incapable of managing the grid due
to having an underdeveloped structure. Because of that complaint some
steps of the process needed to be repeated in order for BE to alter its
structure and receive the concession. The power grid concession process
was automatically halted as well and, similarly, some steps had to be
repeated (represented by ‘ongoing processes’ in Fig. 1). At the moment,
the case is in the district court because Vattenfall has lodged a com-
plaint about supposed errors in the earlier stages of the granting process
(Frese, 2017).
5 Their resignation was not directly related to the issue of the power grid, but
to the inability to ﬁnish the construction of the Berlin Brandenburg airport
(initially scheduled to be opened in 2010). The mayor was accused of mis-
management and corruption (Oltermann, 2014; Hinnecke, Interview 1; Walter,
Interview).
6 He used to be the environment senator, thus BEB sees him as more suitable
for the oﬃce.
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The respondents reiterate that ‘after all, it is a political decision’
(Vattenfall representative; Walter, Interview). The Vattenfall re-
presentative adds: ‘the left party and the green and the social demo-
cratic party – they were sure that they want to buy the grid before the
[re-municipalisation] referendum’ (Interview). Although these parties
constitute a coalition currently wielding power in Berlin, the con-
tracting authority, which originates with the Senate Department of Fi-
nance, must abide by the law and ensure a non-discriminatory proce-
dure. Because Vattenfall has lodged a complaint to the court, the case
may be stuck there for years, similarly to the gas grid concession, but at
the same time the Finance Senator can try to secure a better bargaining
position with regard to the cooperation model (e.g. between Vattenfall
and Berlin Energie or BürgerEnergie Berlin and Berlin Energie).
What makes BEB a front-runner is the fact that coalition parties
support the Energiewende and exert political pressure (see Fig. 1) on
German business entities to comply. In Berlin, one of the goals is the 80
per cent reduction of carbon dioxide emissions by 2050 (Senate re-
presentative, Interview). If the quantity of renewable energy continues
to grow this fast, the grid will need to be modernised and changed into
a smart grid. Since Vattenfall is not interested in expensive investments
in the grid (it has its own gas and coal power plants connected to it),
which can be perceived as another policy failure, BEB’s particular
sensitivity to this issue puts the cooperative in a very good light and
attracts many supporters to its cause – including politicians.
The last aspect listed in the Political set (Fig. 1) that needs to be
mentioned here is changing laws that pertain to investments in co-
operative assets. DGRV reported in 2014 that energy cooperatives on
average pay a 4.26 per cent dividend, which is considerable in com-
parison to interest rates oﬀered by banks, which are close to zero
(Oberhuber, 2014). To protect investors, in July 2014 changes were
introduced to Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch (the German Investment Code,
KAGB). According to these, companies that exceed the investment
threshold of 100 million euros in e.g. grid operation or other holdings
(though not in power and heat generation) must register as investment
funds, be certiﬁed and their boards are required to have experience in
fund management (Oberhuber, 2014; Walter, Interview; Hinnecke,
Interview II). This was the reason behind a sharp fall in establishing
new energy cooperatives in 2014 and 2015 and an investment backlog
of 290 million euros in the energy cooperative sector according to
DGRV (DGRV, 2016). This uncertainty was also shared by BEB and
called its future investments into question. Fortunately, DGRV suc-
cessfully negotiated with Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleis-
tungsaufsicht (the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, BaFin) on
exempting the cooperative from that regulation.
The considerable amount of interest in initiatives such as BEB re-
sults from social factors (see Fig. 1) which are very much to BEB’s ad-
vantage. Germans do identify themselves with Energiewende and re-
gard it as a grass-roots initiative. It is trendy to be eco-friendly, even if
it’s costly. As early as 2012, more than 10 per cent of all German
households have intentionally chosen more expensive electricity tariﬀs
based entirely on renewable energies (Mattes & Wittenberg, 2012, p.
10). Ecological trends in German society are followed by an eagerness
to increase the awareness of citizens about their immediate environ-
ment and arouse their interest in self-governance. This interest in de-
cision-making was evident during the successful referendum on Berlin
water utilities re-municipalisation in 2011, and more recently during a
referendum against urban development at the closed Airport Tempelhof
(also known as Tempelhofer Feld) in 2014 (Die Welt, 2011; Berliner
Zeitung, 2014). These phenomena can stem from disappointment in and
distrust of large corporations, a sentiment which surfaced several times
in the interviews. Peter Schmidt puts it this way:
the cooperative model is gaining more and more importance and
interest. People realise that only privatisation and selling basic in-
frastructure to international corporations, which are only interested
in making proﬁts, […] is not a right strategy for essential
infrastructure like electricity, water. […] You should open the ﬂoor
to direct participation and in this case a cooperative is a good model.
(Schmidt, Interview)
This direct control over the grid might not be as easy as imagined.
Mancur Olson’s (1971) theory of interest groups warns us that organi-
sational growth puts pressure on their principles (p. 2). In 2014, BEB
already had almost 800 members and, if successful, this number will
grow to almost 3,000. Obviously, as BEB collects funds from its mem-
bers, this concern with self-governance boosting BEB membership gives
BEB higher chances to succeed with the grid purchase – every citizen
(and the number of Berlin’s inhabitants is growing) can buy a minimum
of EUR 500 worth of BEB shares7 and have a vote at the general as-
sembly. Regardless of the number of shares purchased, every person
holds one vote to ensure bigger investors do not dominate smaller ones.
By December 2014, BEB collected 10.8 millioneuros, which can be
considered a success. However, it is not clear how much the power grid
will cost. That brings us closer to the Economic set presented in Fig.1.
The city Senate assessed the grid’s value at 400 million euros while
Vattenfall claims it is worth around three billion. One of my inter-
viewees explains the ways of estimating the grid’s value:
[w]e have several hints, we can’t call it data. One is: if you can see
what you can earn, the return of money when you’re in control of
the grid for twenty years, in this concession period. There is one
number – it’s between 800 million and 1.2 billion euros . The other
point is the question: if you built the whole grid next to Berlin, in the
Brandenburg lane, how much would it cost? If you had to buy it all,
every cable, every grid station, then you have the number 2.5–3.3
billion euros. You have these two numbers. Between these two
numbers you will have the price. It is a negotiation. (Vattenfall re-
presentative, Interview)
Steﬀen Walter corroborates this and remarks that the price will be
set most probably near 1 billion euros. He also acknowledges that the
BEB joint venture with BE gives BEB a chance to take out a loan on
better terms than oﬀered by a commercial bank (Interview). Matthias
Futterlieb explains:
when you are buying this kind of infrastructure, you are not doing it
with your own capital. Usually it is 40 per cent as equity share. […]
If we assume that our 11 million euros is 40 per cent plus we get 60
per cent externally funded, then we could at the current stage buy 3
per cent of the grid. (Futterlieb, Interview)
Quite surprisingly, the respondents shared the overall belief that the
money is not important. Matthias Hinnecke claims ‘money is not the
point, because a bank like GLS can collect 50 million euros whenever
they want, if there is political possibility to get the grid, they will col-
lect’ (Interview I). Arwen Colell comments further: ‘if there is a co-
operative that has a chance to take over the grid of a capital city, ev-
eryone would rally’ (Colell, Interview). Finally, even the Vattenfall
representative declares: ‘so you can see it in history, in every nation. If
it is important enough, money doesn’t play a role’ (Vattenfall re-
presentative, Interview).
This position of Vattenfall may seem unusual, but there is a reason
for it – as the Vattenfall representative divulges: ‘[t]his is a diﬃculty
with Vattenfall. The signals from Sweden change from governmental
term to governmental term. Now […] maybe they decide to leave the
country [Germany]’ (Vattenfall representative, Interview). It seems
7 It is established in the BEB membership agreement that the lowest share is to
be 100 euros, thus a minimum of 5 shares gives one person the right to vote at
the general assembly. This gives the general public a number of options, e.g.
ﬁve students or low income people can purchase ﬁve shares and decide among
themselves on one person (or perhaps adopt the rotation principle) who will
represent them at the meetings. Unfortunately, from the Transaction Costs
Economics perspective (Williamson, 1993) such a move does not pay oﬀ.
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clear that the situation of BEB’s direct competitor is uncertain. BEB also
keeps winning other battles – it managed to establish cooperation with
various organisations and now is a part of several cooperative networks.
Strategic cooperation with GLS Bank, especially GLS Treuhand e.V. that
manages the Treugeber accounts, might be important when the con-
cession is granted, and BEB were to look for a good loan oﬀer. Other
networks BEB is a member of, such as Netzwerk Energiewende Jetzt or
Bundesverband Erneubare Energie e.V., are focused on political lob-
bying and representing the electricity cooperative sector. Finally, close
cooperation with other electricity cooperatives from Schönau, Old-
enburg or Hamburg, as well as Berlin organisations such as the pre-
viously mentioned Berliner Energietisch or car-sharing cooperatives,
give BEB more credibility, increase its visibility and might be helpful in
solving its problems in the future. The last two factors listed in this
category are: the argument that money remains in the region if invested
in a local cooperative and the claim that BEB proﬁts will be re-invested
in grid decentralisation. Both aspects deﬁnitely work to the beneﬁt of
the cooperative. Yet, BEB needs to care not only about its external
environment, but also its internal features.
Some of the factors listed in the last set, the Internal factors (Fig.1),
which is based on the Elinor Ostrom (2009) ‘Sustainability of Social-
Ecological Systems’ and Konrad Hagedorn (2008) ‘Institutions of Sus-
tainability’ models, have already been described in detail earlier in this
paper. However, three additional comments need to be made. First, one
of the biggest assets to BEB is an experienced lawyer – Hartmut Gaßner
– on the supervisory board. Without him and his oﬃce (Gaßner, Groth,
Siederer & Coll.) some problems with the oﬃcial bidding procedure
(e.g. responding to the Berlin Senate’s catalogue of questions) would
not have been solved as well or as quickly as they were (Beckmann &
Neumann-Cosel, Interviews). Second, the cooperative governance
structure, although very attractive to citizens, does not ﬁt the models
already present in the market. As Lukas Beckmann emphasises in the
interview, BEB belongs to the Eingetragene Genossenschaft (registered
cooperative society, eG) category which ‘is a diﬀerent form’ than Ge-
sellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (limited liability company, GmbH)
to which category belong the other two entities: Berlin Energie and
Stromnetz Berlin (Vattenfall subsidiary). These two diﬀerent govern-
ance structures have dissimilar ways of decision-making and distribu-
tion of responsibilities, therefore eG might need more time to reach an
agreement on certain issues than GmbH; on the other hand, eG may be
more resistant to economic and political pressures. The third comment
concerns institutions, deﬁned as ‘enduring regularities of human action
in situations structured by rules, norms and shared strategies, as well as
by the physical world’ (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995, p. 582). These in-
stitutions might help in case of conﬂicting interests and limit the op-
portunistic behaviour of actors involved (Spiller & Tomassi, 2008).
Some institutions are outlined in the BEB Statute (Satzung der Bür-
gerEnergie Berlin eG). One of them is the simple majority rule in the
general assembly. The simple majority rule is, according to Bruno S.
Frey, the best known and the most important direct democratic deci-
sion-making mechanism, with all its advantages (easy to understand,
cheap to organise and in accordance with one-person, one-vote prin-
ciple) and shortcomings (e.g. it can be subject to manipulation, it is not
always ‘just’, or preference intensities cannot be revealed – voters can
only vote in favour, against or abstain) (Frey, 1983, 88–90). Another
BEB institution is the no-veto, or no immediate ‘exit’ power
(Hirschman, 1970), which means in practice that withdrawing money
from the cooperative takes three years at a minimum (Satzung der
BürgerEnergie Berlin eG, §9). Albert O. Hirshman in his book ‘Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty’ (Hirschman, 1970) discusses, among others, two
options available to members of the organisation – ‘exit’ or ‘voice’ – in
case they noticed a decrease in the quality of its operation or lack of
proﬁtability of their further involvement. The use of voice means an
attempt to inﬂuence or directly make changes in order to improve the
organisation, which entails certain costs (direct expenses and, for ex-
ample, time and actions taken), while the second option – exit – is
generally costless, except when loyalty is present. In the case of BEB,
the organisation’s statute prevents a cost-free exit, thus encouraging
engagement and use of voice rather than exit. Another BEB internal
institution is the way of making other decisions which, whether it lies
within the purview of the supervisory board, the board of directors or
the team, are made by consensus (Neumann-Cosel & Schmidt,
Interviews). Finally, there is no oﬃcial code of conduct, however new
members are expected to learn how to represent BEB at the ‘campaigner
seminars’ described earlier (Heininger, Interview). BEB actions are not
evaluated in any systematic way either, and although Arwen Colell
insists that the team knows best where to set up the information stand
and what action will be eﬀective (Colell, Interview), it might be rea-
sonable to codify this knowledge in the future. Since the decision on the
concession has not been reached yet, there is still some time for all the
parties to act upon these Social, Political, Economic and Internal ﬁelds.
7. Discussion and directions for further research
The analysis that allowed to answer the given research question led
to the creation of the model (Fig. 1) which complements the existing
knowledge about cooperatives and public utilities. As mentioned in the
introduction to this article, studies on natural monopoly concentrate
mainly on its regulation (Grossman & Cole, 2003; Train, 1991; Spiller &
Tommasi, 2008). Some even point to the impossibility of governance of
utilities by cooperatives (see the polemic with Henry Hansmann in
section ﬁve). At the same time, current research on electricity co-
operatives, though abundant (Holstenkamp & Kahla, 2016;
Holstenkamp et al., 2017; Müller et al., 2015; Rommel et al., 2018;
Yildiz et al., 2015), does not include case studies on applying for a
concession and governing such large utilities. The case study herein
presented, determining its speciﬁc success factors and shortcomings in
the process of running for the concession to Berlin’s power grid by BEB,
is unique and can become an inspiration for further research on this or
similar cases in the future. It can also motivate other cooperatives in the
world to take similar actions.
In addition, due to the lack of empirical research on diﬀerent types
of electricity/energy cooperatives as well as experimental work on
choices and preferences made by cooperative members, which can ex-
plore the conditions for building trust, encouraging participation and
dealing with conﬂicts (argument raised also by Yildiz et al. (2015)),
further studies on these topics are strongly encouraged.
It would be revealing to conduct not only research on cooperative
members, but also on consumers/pro-sumers, using the inter-
disciplinary and comparative perspective to investigate their role in
growth of electricity cooperatives in diﬀerent countries all over the
world. That might be a starting point to broader analyses of economic,
environmental and social patterns.
Finally, this paper analyses the cooperatives as a subject to manage
public utilities, based on the example of the BürgerEnergie Berlin at-
tempting to gain the concession to the Berlin power grid. Yet, it is
important to acknowledge that this is only one of a few possible al-
ternatives to the present status quo described in the third section of this
paper. Another, powerful one, is the re-municipalisation of public goods
and infrastructure (see the example of the Berliner Energietisch de-
scribed earlier in this text) which, as an idea, attracts many citizens and
politicians (especially from left-wing parties). Although these processes
and movements were not the topic of this paper, these phenomena are
of great signiﬁcance and merit further investigation.
8. Conclusions and implications
The share of cooperatives in the energy market in Germany (with
regard to energy from renewable sources in particular) has grown sig-
niﬁcantly over the last decade. Owing to the fact that they are re-
presented by umbrella organisations, build networks and cooperate
with other sectors, as well as are favoured by economic conditions (high
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demand for renewable energy, despite higher prices, and a substantial
price for supplying energy to the grid), they steadily generate sig-
niﬁcant proﬁts for shareholders. The BEB case study analysed in this
article shows that even in large cities they are successful and can, on an
equal footing to giants such as Vattenfall, apply for a concession to
purchase a large infrastructure. The analysis of BEB and its environment
presented in this article was to answer the research question: what are
the internal and external factors, as well as patterns and relationships
among them, considered by BEB’s environment as essential for the
purchase of Berlin’s power grid? It revealed success factors of such a
venture – BEB provided a model that could be used by other energy
cooperatives in Europe and elsewhere, as well as to serve as an in-
spiration to undertake similar challenges or to analyse their own posi-
tion and capabilities. This strengthening of the cooperatives’ position
on the energy market can also be an important sign for public institu-
tions and other companies in the industry.
This article also contributes to the existing knowledge on the topic
of energy cooperatives by identifying three main beneﬁts arising from
the increasing number of energy cooperatives in the market and their
energy infrastructure endeavours. First, all of the described objectives,
assumptions and actions by BEB indicate that if this cooperative, to-
gether with the public institution, takes over the network, they will
bring about a quick transformation of the old network into a modern
smart grid, ensuring that in the future the network will become in-
dependent of energy sources coming from fossil fuels and distribute
energy from renewables only. Secondly, this article may be important
to other companies in the sector – the companies that need to adapt
their production processes to the needs of the green market, as well as
those for whom sustainability is essential. They can become share-
holders in energy cooperatives or cooperate with them in some other
capacity. The last advantage is associated with cooperating with the
public sector, which is regarded as a partner by cooperatives (joint
ownership of the network in this case). The public sector can appreciate
cooperatives as democratic enterprises that come with money, and thus
constitute a relief for local budgets when they decide to re-municipalise
infrastructure.
The story of the grid and the BürgerEnergie Berlin cooperative is not
over yet and has many nuanced layers that can be studied further.
Despite various (and sometimes conﬂicting) future BEB scenarios ima-
gined by its members, one thing is certain – they have already suc-
ceeded:
it is such a diﬀerence made in the city. […] Even if they give the grid
to Vattenfall, the company will be forced to implement more in
terms of civil participation, more in terms of Energiewende. Still it
would be a change, something which we have created together with
the people of the city. (Colell, Interview)
Although electricity cooperatives might be perceived as ‘new wine
in old bottles’ (after Pier Angelo Mori, 2013), the BEB case shows that
there is a signiﬁcant change in people’s attitudes and a shift in values
towards a more sustainable and ecological management of public uti-
lities. Could it be that the Amory B. Lovins' road has been chosen by the
people of Berlin?
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